We propose a new nonparametric estimator for first-price auctions with independent private values that imposes the monotonicity constraint on the estimated inverse bidding strategy. We show that our estimator has a smaller asymptotic variance than that of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong's (2000) estimator. In addition to establishing pointwise asymptotic normality of our estimator, we provide a bootstrap-based approach to constructing uniform confidence bands for the density function of latent valuations. * This version: and Parmeter (2009) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on monotone nonparametric regression. 1 variance will result in sharper inference. Our estimator also has substantial computational advantage over Henderson et al. (2012). 2 As a by-product, our method also produces a simple estimator for the true bidding function. Note that GPV's procedure is based on the inverse-bidding strategy, which has a simple form. On the other hand, the bidding function has an integral expression that depends on the unknown distribution of latent valuations and constructing its direct plug-in type estimator would be cumbersome. Our simple estimator of the bidding function can be of interest on its own, as it can be used in practical applications for computing counterfactual bids.
Introduction
Shape restrictions on infinite-dimensional parameters have received much attention in econometric research. The roles of shape restrictions in the literature include facilitating identification, providing testable implications and improving estimation and inference. See Chetverikov et al. (2018) for a recent review. This paper focuses on the first-price sealed-bid auction model with symmetric bidders, which is the same as that studied in Guerre et al. (2000, GPV, hereafter) . GPV's estimation strategy uses a nonparametrically estimated inverse bidding function to generate pseudo valuations. However, the true bidding strategy must be strictly increasing and the plug-in nonparametric estimator of GPV ignores this shape restriction. Imposing such a constraint at the estimation stage nonparametrically is interesting. For this purpose, we may use the methods in the monotone nonparametric regression literature. 1 Some of these methods can be easily adapted to producing constrained estimators for the inverse bidding strategy in the auction setting. E.g., Henderson et al. (2012) take the constrained re-weighting approach pioneered by Hall and Huang (2001) , which was originally used to build a monotone estimator for the conditional expectation function. Luo and Wan (2018) impose monotonicity by using the greatest convex minorant of the integrated quantile function of values.
In this paper, we pursue a different approach. We investigate the asymptotic properties of a new monotonicityconstrained estimator based on the smooth rearrangement approach of and propose a uniform confidence band around this monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimator. We show that this rearrangementbased monotonicity-constrained estimator is asymptotically normal with an asymptotic variance smaller than the unconstrained estimator as in GPV. Since the asymptotic variance plays an important role in determining the width of a uniform confidence band in large samples, the fact that the rearrangement-based estimator has a smaller asymptotic 2 The Auction Model and Estimation
In this section, we consider an auction model for homogeneous goods and with a fixed number of bidders. A model with observed covariates capturing auction-specific heterogeneity will be considered in Section 5. The econometrician observes bids from L auctions, with a fixed number of bidders in each auction:
{B il : i = 1, . . . , N, l = 1, . . . , L} .
(2.1)
Bidders' valuations {V il : i = 1, . . . , N, l = 1, . . . , L} are not unobservable to the econometrician. We assume the distribution of the valuations satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Data Generating Process). (a). The unobserved valuations {V il : i = 1, . . . , N, l = 1, . . . , L} are i.i.d. with PDF f and CDF F . (b). f is strictly positive and bounded away from zero on its support, a compact interval [v, v] ⊆ R + , and is twice continuously differentiable on (v, v) .
Assumption 1(a) assumes that the bidders are symmetric and the auctions are identical. Assumption 1 is similar to Assumptions A1 and A2 of GPV and Assumption 1 of MMS. The object of interest is the PDF of the valuations at interior points of [v, v] . Suppose that v l > v, v u < v and I := [v l , v u ] is an inner closed sub-interval of [v, v] .
We assume that the observed bids are generated from the valuations and by the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) bidding strategy:
The BNE requires that the bidding strategy s is strictly increasing. Moreover, GPV show that s is at least three times continuously differentiable on (v, v) . The inverse of the BNE bidding strategy can be written as
where G and g are CDF and PDF of the bids, respectively. Let b := s (v) and b := s (v) denote the boundaries of support for the observed i.i.d. bids. GPV show that g is three-times continuously differentiable and also bounded away from zero on its support b, b :
Let G be the empirical CDF of the bids:
and g be the kernel density estimator of g:
with some bandwidth h g > 0 and kernel K g . Therefore, the plug-in nonparametric estimator of the inverse bidding strategy ξ is
.
(2.6)
For each B il , we construct a pseudo valuation by V il := ξ (B il ). There is a boundary bias issue when ordinary kernel density estimator as in (2.5) is used. Thus, the pseudo valuations corresponding to bids in boundary regions are contaminated. GPV propose to trim off bids that lie in
We modify the kernel density estimator
to avoid boundary bias and trimming. 3 Another concern is that, in order to remove more bias, we need to make use of the fact that the bid density g is smoother than the valuation density f and use a higher-order kernel when estimating the inverse bidding strategy. 4 A suitable choice is the local quadratic minimum contrast estimator (MCE). See Bickel and Doksum (2015, Chapter 11.3) . 5 Similar to the local polynomial regression, the local quadratic MCE automatically adapts to the boundary so that the rate of the bias is the same in the boundary region and the interior. 6 The local quadratic MCE coincides with the kernel density estimator (2.5) with a fourth-order kernel, and therefore we achieve desired bias removal in the interior region
for some bandwidth h f > 0 and kernel K f . We note again that trimming can be avoided.
Another important observation is that the plug-in estimator (2.6) may not be monotone in finite samples, although its population counterpart ξ is strictly increasing under the assumption that the empirical auction model is correctlyspecified. We apply smooth rearrangement to build a new monotonicity-constrained estimator of ξ on the plug-in estimator ξ. Define
for some bandwidth h r > 0 and (second-order) kernel function K r . Denote K r (u) := u −∞ K r (t) dt. Alternatively we can write It is clear that s is increasing on R and
It is easy to see that s can be viewed as an estimator of the bidding function s (see Lemma 2). Note that this estimator is of interest on its own, as the bidding function s is an important structural object. Moreover, constructing an estimator of s directly from its expression in (2.2) can be cumbersome.
Let s −1 denote the pseudo inverse of s:
s −1 is a rearrangement-based estimator of ξ with the monotonicity constraint imposed. A new modified GPV estimation procedure now can be proposed: First, we construct ξ, the plug-in nonparametric estimator of the inverse bidding strategy ξ. To avoid trimming, we use the local quadratic MCE instead of the ordinary kernel density estimator. Then, we construct the monotonicity-imposed estimator of the inverse bidding strategy: s −1 and generate monotonicity-constrained pseudo valuations V † il := s −1 (B il ) for i = 1, ..., N , l = 1, ..., L. A new estimator, the rearrangement-based GPV (RGPV), is
The RGPV estimation procedure is computationally more involved than the standard GPV procedure. When implementing it in practice, the integral in (2.8) can be approximated by an upper Riemann sum. Let M ∈ N be a very large number. Let d :
However, unlike the estimator in Henderson et al. (2012) , it is not required to solve a constrained optimization problem. Thus the RGPV estimation procedure is computationally less demanding than Henderson et al. (2012) 's estimation procedure, which is based on constrained reweighting.
An alternative, and closely related, approach is to impose the monotonicity restriction through the "non-smooth" rearrangement. Instead of using (2.7), we can define
and use s −1 0 as a monotonicity-constrained estimator of ξ to generated pseudo valuations. If the empirical auction model is correctly specified so that ξ is strictly increasing, s −1 0 is always an improvement over the plug-in estimator ξ, in the sense that s −1 0 has a strictly smaller (finite-sample) integrated mean square error whenever ξ is not monotonic. See Chernozhukov et al., 2009 , Proposition 1. However, for the structural auction model, the parameter of interest is the density f . It is unclear whether the density estimator based on pseudo valuations generated by s −1 0 is an improvement over the unconstrained GPV estimator theoretically. In this paper, we focus on smooth rearrangement and in the next section, we show that based on the RGPV estimator we could potentially achieve sharper inference in large samples, which can be regarded as theoretical advantage over the unconstrained GPV estimator.
Asymptotic Properties
The following assumptions are imposed on the kernel functions and the bandwidths, respectively.
Assumption 2 (Kernel). K f is a probability density function that is symmetric around 0, compactly supported on [−1, 1] and has at least two Lipschitz continuous derivatives on R. Moreover, K r = K f and the same kernel function is used in the local quadratic MCE of the bid density.
h and h r = λ r h for some positive constants λ f , λ g and λ r .
Assumption 2 implies that the kernel functions are of second order. When the kernel used in the local quadratic MCE of the bid density is second-order, at the interior points, the MCE is the same as the ordinary kernel density estimator (2.5) with K g being fourth-order. Assumption 3 is similar to Assumption 3 in MMS.
It is shown in MMS that under assumptions 1-3,
where the remainder term is uniform in v ∈ I. The asymptotic variance is the limit of the leading term of (3.9) as h ↓ 0:
A consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance V RGP V (v) can be derived based on the sample analogue of V M (v).
Remark 3.2. The proof of Theorem 1 also incorporates the bias term:
A comparison of ι (v) with the bias given in Remark 2.3 of MMS shows that the smooth rearrangement incurs additional bias. For inference, we take the "under-smoothing" approach to select sufficiently small bandwidths so that these bias terms become negligible.
Remark 3.3. MMS show that the GPV estimator has a smaller asymptotic variance than the quantile-based estimator of Marmer and Shneyerov (2012) . The proof of (3.8) uses similar arguments. It is easy to show that the inequality (3.8) is strict for all v ∈ (v, v), if the kernel function satisfies K ′ (u) < 0 for all u ∈ (0, 1) and K ′ (u) > 0 for all u ∈ (−1, 0).
Suppose that the valuations are drawn from the family of distributions
supported on [0, 1] with some parameter θ > 0. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in this example is
In this example, we choose the triweight kernel
We can analytically evaluate the multi-dimensional integrals in (3.2) and (3.7) and calculate V GP V (v) /V RGP V (v) in this example. We experiment with different combinations of (θ, N ), and find that the ratio
be quite large in my cases. For instance, in the case of (θ, N ) = (1, 5),
Inference
If the asymptotic variance V RGP V (v) in (3.7) can be consistently estimated by some estimator V RGP V (v), Theorem 1 shows that we can construct an asymptotically valid confidence interval for f (v):
As shown in (3.8), our rearrangement-based estimator has a smaller asymptotic variance than the GPV estimator.
Therefore, the confidence intervals based on our estimator in (4.1) should be shorter than those based on the GPV estimator in (3.3) in large samples.
The integral can be approximated by an upper Riemann sum in practice. The following result provides uniform consistency of the variance estimator and also an estimate of its uniform rate of convergence. The proof uses the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 of MMS.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 -3 are satisfied. Then,
An alternative approach to constructing pointwise confidence intervals is based on bootstrapping. Let
denote a set of independent random variables drawn from the original sample (2.1) with replacement. G * and g * denote the bootstrap analogues of G and g respectively. Let ξ * be the bootstrap analogue of ξ. ξ * is defined by replacing G and g with G * and g * . We further define
and bootstrap analogues of V † il , denoted by V † * il , i = 1, . . . , N , l = 1, . . . , L by using the pseudo inverse of s * . Lastly, we construct a bootstrap analogue of f RGP V :
given the original sample. The pointwise inference results for f (v) described above can be extended for the inference on the optimal reserve price, as the latter is a function of the density at the reserve price. Such an extension is discussed in Section 8 in MMS. Similarly, a function of the density (1 − F (v))/f (v) is of interest in applications as it represents the markup of the bidder with value v. Again, since relatively to GPV's our rearrangement estimator has a smaller asymptotic variance, basing inference on optimal reserve price or the markup on our estimator would result in more powerful tests and shorter confidence intervals.
Next, we show that a bootstrap-based uniform confidence band for {f (v) : v ∈ I} centered at the rearrangementbased estimator can be constructed by using intermediate Gaussian approximation pioneered by Chernozhukov et al. (2014b Chernozhukov et al. ( ,a, 2016 . Consider the following bootstrap process 
The following theorem establishes the asymptotic validity of CB RGP V . Its proof uses the same arguments as in the proof of Corollary 4.3 of MMS.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 -3 are satisfied. Then,
Auction-Specific Heterogeneity
In previous sections, we focused on the case of identical auctions with a fixed number of bidders. In this section, we consider auction models with auction-specific heterogeneity. The econometrician observes data from L auctions. Let X l denote the d-dimensional relevant characteristics for the object in the l-th auction. Let N l denote the number of bidders in the l-th auction. Let B il denote the bid submitted by the i-th bidder in the l-th auction. The data observed by the econometrician is given by
Unobserved bidders' valuations are denoted by
Assume that {(X l , N l ) : l = 1, ..., L} are i.i.d. and for each l = 1, ..., L, given X l = x and N l = n, the valuations {V il : i = 1, ..., n} are i.i.d. with conditional PDF f (·|x). We follow the literature and assume that the valuations and the number of bidders N l are conditionally independent given the observed characteristics X l . 7 Also assume that the conditional probability mass function of N l given X l has a known support {n, ..., n}.
The observed bid B il is assumed from the Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding for risk-neutral bidder i submitted in the l-th auction. Let G (·|x, n) denote the conditional CDF of B il given X l = x and N l = n. Let g (·|x, n) be the conditional PDF. The inverse bidding strategy in this context becomes
(5.1)
For estimation and inference, we can generate pseudo valuations from (5.1) by replacing the true conditional CDF and PDF by their kernel estimators. The GPV estimator can be defined analogously in this general context. Asymptotically valid pointwise confidence intervals and uniform confidence bands for f (·|x) can be constructed. See
Section 5 of MMS for more details.
Following Haile et al. (2003) , we use a semi-parametric approach to homogenize the bids. 8 Let {ǫ il : i = 1, ..., N l , l = 1, ..., L} (5.2) denote positive i.i.d. idiosyncratic values that are independent from the auction-specific characteristics X l , l = 1, ..., L. Let F ǫ be its CDF and [ǫ, ǫ] be its support. Define
be the conditional CDF and g (b|n) be the corresponding conditional PDF. Note that we have
( 5.3)
The approach of Haile et al. (2003) assumes that, for some parametric function Υ to be specified below, V il = Υ (X l ) ǫ il for i = 1, ..., N l and l = 1, ..., L. It then can be shown that the conditional CDF and PDF of Υ (X l ) B il (denoted by G Υ and g Υ , respectively) satisfy
It is clear from these results and (5.3) that
which implies that B il = Υ (X l ) B il , for i = 1, ..., N l and l = 1, ..., L.
Now, we write
It is easy to check that E [U il |X l , N l ] = 0. Since N l is discrete, we can write
We assume that the function Υ is log-linear in parameters: log (Υ (X l )) = X T l β for some unknown β. Now (5.4) can be written as
Regressing the log-bids on the covariates and the indicators for the number of bidders yields an estimator β of β.
Then, the homogenized bids are given by
.., N l and l = 1, ..., L.
(5.5)
These bids can be interpreted as the bid that would have been submitted by the i-th bidder if the covariates were equal to x 0 , in the l-th auction. Suppose we are interested in inference on f (·|x 0 ) for some fixed x 0 . 9
Let
s (·, n) can also be defined analogously and s −1 (·, n) is its pseudo inverse. Let V 0 † il := s −1 B 0 il , N l be the monotonicity-constrained pseudo valuations.
which is asymptotically normal. Its asymptotic variance can be consistently estimated by
A pointwise confidence interval for f (v|x 0 ) that is of the same form as (4.1) can be proved to be asymptotically valid. For bootstrap resampling, we treat the homogenized bids (5.5) as our observed bids and apply the two-step resampling procedure provided by Marmer and Shneyerov (2012) . In each bootstrap replication, we first randomly draw L observations from {N l : l = 1, ..., L} with replacement. Next, we randomly draw bids with replacement from bids corresponding to the selected number of bidders. If for the l-th observation in the bootstrap sample, we have N * l = N l ′ , then let B 0 * il : i = 1, ..., N * l be i.i.d. draws from all the bids in auctions with number of bidders being N l ′ with replacement. Now the bootstrap sample is B 0 * il , N * l , i = 1, ..., N * l and l = 1, ..., L. Then it is straightforward to construct the bootstrap analogue of f (·|x 0 ) and a bootstrap-based uniform confidence band for f (·|x 0 ) can be constructed analogously.
Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, we assess the finite-sample performances of the uniform confidence bands based on both the unconstrained GPV estimator and the rearrangement-based monotonicity-constrained estimator proposed in this paper.
Our simulation design follows Marmer and Shneyerov (2012) and the DGP is described in Remark 3.3. We consider θ = 1 and draw 2100 independent valuations from F θ . In all these cases, the number of bidders N is constant. The number of auctions is determined by N · L = 2100. We choose K r = K f to be the second-order triweight kernel. For estimation of the inverse bidding strategy, we use the second-order triweight kernel in the MCE. In this case, the kernel K g in the expressions of the asymptotic variances is the fourth-order triweight kernel.
We use the same bandwidths as in GPV. We take h g = 3.72 · σ b · (N · L) −1/5 when estimating the inverse bidding The main result of this paper is that imposing monotonicity using smooth rearrangement results in more efficient inference. Therefore, in addition to assessing coverage accuracy, we also report the ratio of the supremum widths of the confidence bands: Table 1 reports the coverage probabilities as well as the relative supremum width of the confidence bands based on the GPV and our rearrangement estimators. The coverage probabilities of both methods are similar and accurate. However, our approach can produce considerably smaller confidence with the reduction in supremum width ranging from 6.8% to 33.4%. More substantial reductions in supremum width are obtained for smaller numbers of bidders. This is due to the inverse relationship between the number of bidders and the asymptotic variance of the estimators.
Conclusion
The GPV nonparametric identification and estimation approach is an indispensable working tool in structural econometrics of auctions. This paper contributes to the literature by showing how one can reduce the asymptotic variance of GPV-type estimators by incorporating the monotonicity constraint in estimation. While monotonicity-constrained estimators have been previously considered in the auction literature, to the best of our knowledge ours is the first to obtain a reduction in asymptotic variance in this context. Our method is simple to implement, and as a by-product, it also produces a simple estimator for the bidding function. We also discuss construction of uniform confidence bands for the density of valuations. In a simulation study, we show that by applying our approach one can increase the precision of the confidence bands without sacrificing their coverage in finite samples. Newey, W. K. (1994) . Kernel estimation of partial means and a general variance estimator. Econometric Theory 10 (2), 1-21.
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Appendix
Let denote an inequality up to a universal constant that does not depend on the sample size L. For a sequence of classes of functions F L (that may depend on the sample size) defined on b, b d , for some d ≥ 1, let N ǫ, F L , · Q,2 denote the ǫ−covering number, i.e., the smallest integer m such that there are m balls of radius ǫ centered at points in F L , with respect to the metric induced by the norm · Q,2 , where f Q,2 := |f | 2 dQ
We say that F L is a (uniform) Vapnik-Chervonenkis-type (VC-type) class with respect to the envelope F L (see, e.g., Chernozhukov et al., 2014b , Definition 2.1) if there exist some positive constant C 1 and C 2 that are independent of L such that
for all finitely discrete probability measure Q on b, b d . Note that the all function classes that appear later are dependent on L. We suppress the dependence for notational simplicity.
"With probability approaching 1" is abbreviated as "w.p.a.1". For notational simplicity, in the proofs, max i,l is understood as max (i,l)∈{1,...,N }×{1,...,L} .
(2)
is understood as (j,k) =(i,l) and
( 3) is understood as i,l (j,k) =(i,l) (j ′ ,k ′ ) =(i,l), (j ′ ,k ′ ) =(j,k)
, i.e., summing over all distinct indices. (N · L) 2 is understood as (N · L) (N · L − 1) and (N · L) 3 is understood as
A Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Theorem 1. It follows from Lemma 7 that
Then it is clear that
Note that we assumed h r = h f . By change of variables,
wherev andv are mean values that are dependent on w and z with |v − v| ≤ h f |w| and |v − v| ≤ h f |z|.
Since when h f is small enough,
(1) follows from this result and Lemma 6.
Define
By change of variables,
We can easily verify that the dominated convergence theorem applies to the integral on the right hand side of (A.2) (as h ↓ 0) for each y ∈ R:
Since K ′ f and K r are compactly supported on [−1, 1], by reverse triangle inequality,
where C s ′ := sup v∈ [v,v] s ′ (v).
Now the dominated convergence theorem applies and
where the second equality follows from the relation f (v) = g (s (v)) s ′ (v). It follows from this result and sup
and thus
By the c r inequality (see, e.g., Davidson, 1994, 9.28) , we have
Then it is easy to verify that the Lyapunov's condition holds:
For the second part, it suffices to show
For each w ∈ R, since K r and K ′ f are assumed to be bounded and compactly supported, the Fubini-Tonelli theorem applies and therefore,
Since K r and K ′ f are supported on [−1, 1], by integration by parts,
for each w ∈ R, where the first equality follows from (A.8), the second equality follows from the Fubini-Tonelli theorem and the inequality follows from Jensen's inequality since K f is a probability density function.
Since the inequality (A.9) holds for all w ∈ R, by the Fubini-Tonelli theorem,
Now for any fixed (u, w) ∈ R 2 , by change of variables,
Then,
It follows from change of variables that
for all u ∈ R. The conclusion follows from this result, (A.11) and the assumption K r = K f .
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 3.1 of MMS. Let
By the arguments used in the proof of Lemma 3,
, for all v ∈ I, w.p.a.1.
By using Lemma 1, Lemma 2, (B.14), Taylor expansion, tedious algebra and empirical process techniques invoked in the proof of Theorem 3.1 of MMS, one can show that
. One can apply Hoeffding decomposition to V (v) and apply techniques invoked in the proof of Theorem 3.1 of MMS from empirical process and U process theory to derive the uniform rate of convergence of V (v) − V M (v). Then the conclusion follows.
Proof of Theorem 3. First, it can be verified by standard arguments that the function class M ‡ 2 (·; v) : v ∈ I is (uniformly) VC-type with respect to a constant envelope that is a multiple of h −2 f h −1 g . Then it essentially follows from Lemma 7 and Theorem 2 that the process
can be approximated by 
can be shown to be O p log (L) 1/2 (Lh) −1/2 uniformly over the entire support b ∈ b, b , by using standard arguments (see, e.g., Newey, 1994) . Therefore,
By using (B.1), (B.2) and (2.4), 
Proof of Lemma 2. By the definition of s, we have
For any t ∈ ξ b , ξ b , s ′ (t) > 0 if the measurable set b ∈ b, b : ξ (b) − t ≤ h r has positive measure. Let
By Lemma 1, r ξ = o p (h). Consequently, r ξ ≤ h r /2 w.p.a.1, and
Since ξ is continuous and strictly increasing on b, b , b ∈ b, b : ξ (b) − t ≤ h r has positive measure.
For Part (b), by change of variables and Fubini-Tonelli theorem, we have
By a mean value expansion, we have For Part (d), note
By arguments that are similar to those used to prove (B.10), 
